Thursday, December 4, 2008

Caroline Smith

International Relations of India

Dr. Marshall Bouton

November 28, 2008

The Role of the Indo-American Diaspora in the Nuclear Deal
The historic Indo-U.S. nuclear deal cleared its final hurdle on October 2, 2008, with the U.S. Senate voting to ratify it 86-13. The significance of the deal, known as the US-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement), reverses 34 years of U.S. policy opposing nuclear cooperation with India. It also gives India the much-desired status and recognition as a de facto nuclear weapons state, recognition which will finally allow India to take part in international nuclear commerce and its scientists to participate in international nuclear research. For India, the approval is a ringing endorsement of its increasing weight in international affairs and an acknowledgement of its growing partnership with the States. For both, the deal will be a significant and unprecedented legacy.
The deal was a culmination of over three years of negotiations and political muscle flexing abroad and at home. Indeed, some believe the role of the Indo-US community made nuclear cooperation a reality, marking the political arrival of the diaspora. Others are more skeptical, adopting a "wait and see" attitude regarding further political activity.
In the U.S., Indian-Americans are seen as the educated, technologically savvy and wealthy minority with growing political influence. In India, the community is seen (albeit recently) as a means to help further Indian foreign policy and security goals as well as contribute toward its economic development.
While the Indian-American diaspora's political activism received much media attention, the influence attributed to the community's political power is overstated at worst, pre-mature at best. Regardless, "the Indian community in the United States constitutes an invaluable asset in strengthening India's relationship with the world's only superpower" (Dutt 181). It is important to watch future actions of the community as it could be India's trump card to becoming a global power. It will depend on a lot of factors, political and economic, but especially the commonality of interests between the United States and India. The nuclear deal, for now, seems like a strong first step and has both national and international implications.
The Indian-American Community: A Background
The Indian-American community is recognized as one of the influential ethnic communities and is often referred to as a model minority. According to the 2007 Census, the Indian American population stands at over 2.5 million people, a fact which some say bodes well for a greater presence of Indians in U.S. politics over time. The following statistics show a model minority indeed:
- A median income of $69,470, nearly double the median income of all American families ($38,8850).
- 200,000 Indian-American millionaires.
- 64.4% of Indian-Americans over the age of 25 have a college degree
- 57.7% of Indian-Americans in the workforce are employed as managers or professionals
-There are 38,000 Indian-American physicians.
-300,00 Indian-Americans work in the high-tech industry.
-15% of Silicon Valley start-up firms are owned by Indian-Americans
-5,000 Indian-Americans are on the faculties of institutions of higher learning.
-80,000 Indians are studying in the US representing 13 percent of the total foreign enrollment in US colleges and universities--the highest number from any country.
-There are four Fortune 500 companies with Indian-American CEOs.
(Statistics from USINPAC)
Political power has always correlated to wealth and "the general wealth of this population could be translated into considerable political power, if other factors were held equal" (Khagram 272).
It stands to reason that Indian political activity is more likely to be found in the cities and states with high concentrations of this population. Yet "Asian Indians are the most geographically dispersed of all the major Asian American groups" (Khagram 269-70). Unlike the Jewish community in New York or the Cuban community in Miami, the Indian-American community is not geographically concentrated to allow significant political influence in crucial electoral states.
The Indian diaspora is anything but homogenous. India itself is a land of diversity. It comprises 16 major and distinct language groups and has at least four major religious communities (Helweg 106). Most Indian-Americans choose to identify with their different regional, linguistic, and religious groupings. This results in the diffusion of mobilization efforts and raises the question of how such a community could achieve and maintain a permanent sense of national identity and unity. According to the High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora, "a weakness of the Indian community has [...] been its failure to unite. [...] This has inevitably adversely impacted the community's ability to leverage its substantial strengths and capabilities in the political sphere."
The Road to Political Mobilization
"Involvement in US foreign policy is in fact often one of the clearest indications that an ethnic community has 'arrived' in American society, and that it has demonstrated its willingness not only to reinforce and uphold American values such as democracy and pluralism inside America, but promote these values abroad." Yossi Shain, Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Tel-Aviv University
Indian-Americans are popularly perceived as being a politically apathetic minority. In relation to other Asian American groups or the Jews, Indians have a long way to go. The comparison to the Jewish community is the most interesting since the Indo-American community has studied (and piggybacked on) the lobbying skills of the groups to achieve certain political ends.
However, Khagram argues that Indians have a much longer history in the U.S. than is conventionally known and have especially become more involved in U.S. politics over the last three decades (Khagram 277).
The U.S. Asian Indian experience can be divided into two broad historical periods: before and after the 1965 immigration reform act during which their biggest contribution was defining racial meanings and practices in the states, especially the construction of Asian American and white American categories (Khagram 259). Attacks on Indian women in the late 1980s demonstrated the need for political empowerment and the 1990s saw growing political mobilization by the community.
Amit Gupta, an associate professor at the U.S. Airforce Air War College, stated in an essay written in 1994: "In the Indian case, two major events have worked to raise political consciousness and mobilize the diaspora. The first event was the growing tensions between India and Pakistan that were exacerbated with India's 1998 decision to test nuclear weapons. The second was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the U.S."
In 1994, the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans was created. Yet political involvement and political effectiveness are two very different things.
Gupta stressed the need to clarify the nature of political involvement seen from the community, pointing out a difference between lobbying for better foreign relations with India and lobbying for the mayor to jail dog-busters. In a 1996 survey of Asian Indians, a question asked respondents to choose the most important issue facing the United States; three issues--crime, education, an the economy--were among the top chosen. Those issues have repeatedly been found to be three of the top concerns of Americans generally (Khagram 276) revealing some major political concerns as not just group-specific (i.e., immigration or U.S. relations with India).
Since 1965, the impact of Indians on the relations between the U.S. and India has been largely negligible (Khagram 280). Rather Gupta argues, political activity has been inwardly focused with a great deal of political mobilization taking place which effects the community whether through economic enhancements, securing legal protection, or developing networking ties that would promote careers of the next generation of Indian-Americans.
To many, the nuclear deal was a reversal of that.
"Every community has a [political] tipping point that propels them forward or backward," said Sanjay Puri, chairman of the US India Political Action Committee (USINPAC). "[The nuclear deal] was one of those points. The community really got together and got energized. I personally must have talked to hundreds of people. I think we all knew we had a chance to truly make history. This was a proper bottom-up top-down grassroots campaign." USINPAC is a national, bipartisan political action committee and works with members of Congress as well as the administration.
There are many theories for why the Indian-American community lobbied for the deal, from economic motivations to fear of adverse reactions from Indians who didn't want a closer relations with the U.S. Puri believes it was simply love.
"How many Indians do you know in the nuclear industry [who could benefit from nuclear trade]? None. Indian-Americans have been here 20-30 years. They're Americans. They love this country and also love the opportunities their country of origin gave them. People started saying hey, it's not just about running businesses, it's also about giving back. Having worked for all these decades [...] what would be better than to have a stronger strategic partnership? It was taking the relationship to the next logical position."
As for influence from other outside entities supplanting Indo-American advocacy, Puri questions their political leverage. "I'm sure [American businesses like] GE wanted this to pass because they were interested in building plants. I don't know if you get 80 percent in Congress because GE wanted it to pass, though. If that were the case, GE would win every battle. I understand that these folks probably reached out to their respective representatives, and that's good, but I presume members of Congress [did not vote for] it because a couple of companies wanted it to happen. Congressmen vote according to the interests of their constituents."

******The Community Did NOT Play a Role******

Shain states that diaspora groups tend to support the home country as long as it fits into the interests of the host nation. "The development of significantly better ties between India and the United States have come about not primarily because of lobbying efforts of Indian-Americans but, instead, due to a changed political perception in both countries. (Gupta)"
Gupta argues the combination of the U.S.'s foreign agenda and India's need for energy converged, resulting in nuclear legislation.
"What happened is that the Bush administration recognized its long-term competitor is China. To balance China, the U.S. needed to build up its regional powers. One of those is India. Meanwhile, India's problem is power and energy and it was looking for a way to fix this problem. [India[ went to the French and the Russians who said talk to the Americans. [India] went to Condoleeza Rice and Ashley Tellis who said, 'Hm, India is a democracy.' From there, what you started seeing was a push for the nuclear deal coming out of the Bush administration. By and large, the diaspora made noise but what came about was an administration initiative. Non-state entities can facilitate or complicate legislation, but more often than not they do not determine major outcomes in international relations. Governments are still the most important actors. In real terms, unless the administration had wanted [the nuclear deal] to happen, it wouldn't have happened. It's too small a diaspora and it doesn't have that kind of money to throw around."
He also dispelled the business-interest theory: "The Indian-American community doesn't make enough money to have business interests. When it comes to selling hundred billion dollar contracts the people who get to the table are big multi-national companies. Software companies don't have that."
Gupta questioned the political influence of the select few well-to-do Indian diaspora, calling for more data to measure their political influence. "I think one of the worst things that has been said about this diaspora is that it has become politically active. It is more a case of U.S. foreign interest. The case is overstated and [the Indian-American community] likes the idea of overstating it because it makes them look important.
Dr. Bal Ram Singh, director for Indic Studies at Dartmouth took a more neutral stance. "I think [the diaspora] did play a role, but how effective they were is hard to tell." Singh likewise thinks the real initiative came from the Bush administration. "[If the diaspora had not lobbied] I don't think the outcome would be different. I just think it would have taken longer and President Bush would have worked harder."
Dr. Rajen Anand is the chairman of the National Federation of Indian American Association (NFIA). While he fully believes the Indian-American diaspora had a major role in influencing members of Congress, especially democrats, he "gives credit to President Bush. He and Condoleeza Rice worked very hard. They got some help from the Indian community. If not for them, the Indian community would not have been able to do it."
For Anand, there is "no question of [the Indian community] going back" to its earlier politically fragmented days. "Our job was to educate the community to really get involved. [The diaspora] is not very prone to getting involved in the political system because they are busy with their own businesses. [The nuclear deal] was a good issue [to rally people]. We held lots of meetings and lots of conference calls."
Singh considers the nuclear deal a political 'tipping point' for the community insofar as it created a paradigm in Indian and American perceptions of each other. "Indians and Americans might feel much more comfortable [with each other] and it might deepen the relationship and bridge the gap between the two," Singh said. The deal could also have positive impacts on acceptance of Indian economics and politics, he said.
Singh challenged the idea that the issue unified the Indo-American community by pointing out the community remained divided. "Some people opposed the deal, some supported it and to some, it didn't apply to them," he said. "Muslims in India opposed the deal [because they viewed it as the] U.S. and India getting together. Even the Hindu community was divided. In terms of Hindus, there are too many voices. Communists opposed the deal; academia in U.S. opposed the deal saying there was imperial motivation."
Robert Hathaway is the Director for the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Prior to this, he served for twelve years on the professional staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. Hathaway also heard of in-fighting among various Indian-American groups via insiders involved in lobby efforts. "I think [the diaspora] still has an inability to work together and it really dilutes their political power."
From the beginning, Hathaway knew the bill would be passed. "When the president first signed the bill in 2005-06, I was saying then the votes were there. Bush was going to make this a very important international security idea. I found it very difficult to believe that republicans would oppose it. I assumed a large majority of republicans would support [the bill] by a substantial majority. On the democrat's side, more than a hundred members are on the India Caucus and publicly sided with the legislation. I didn't expect all democratic members of the caucus would support it, but I always thought a substantial minority would join with an overwhelming majority of republicans. So I never bought into the scenario endorsed in newspapers that catered to the Indo-American community. I never bought that [the bill] almost died and [the community] rallied around to save it." He is cautious in ascribing them political influence, because he 'hasn't been able to demonstrate that [the diaspora] changed minds."
Hathaway remains open-minded on the future political activity of the community. "I'm on the side of let's wait and see. [The nuclear deal will have been a] tipping point only if facts in the future indicate whether it was a tipping point. In [the Indian-American diaspora's] minds, it was clearly a coming-of-age moment for them. I'd say it's too early to tell."

******The Dissenters******

"In my opinion the BJP opposed it out of political convenience," Hathaway said.
I'D LIKE TO THANK...
The Indian Government's Gratitude
During and after the nuclear deal, the Indian government frequently issued statements acknowledging the lobbying efforts of the community. In September 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thanked the Indian community "for their role in mobilizing support for the deal in the House of Representatives." He hailed the diaspora as "the brain bank of their adopted country" and expressed hope that the community would become "the brain bridge between the two countries." (the Hidustan Times)
The government of India aided the growth of the overseas community as it began to see the economic advantages of having a closer relationship (Helweg 13). This has not always been the case.
For many years, the Indian government had adopted a nationalistic view toward Indian communities living outside of India. Since "these people had voluntarily left their country of origin, they should not be given (or allowed to retain) Indian nationality but should adopt the nationality of the country in which they were permanently settled" (Dutt 189).
As for the Indian-American community, legislation allowed the diaspora to move entire households to the U.S. and, more importantly, secure citizenship. This naturally led to diffusion of ties with the home country (Gupta).
The Indian government has much it could gain from a closer relationship with its diaspora. Acting on the neoliberal economic reforms inaugurated in India in 1991, the government has urged Indians in the US to increase trade with India, as well as invest money and establish businesses there (Khagram 280). Here, one can gain insight to a possible motive behind the Indian government's wide public praise of its American-based diaspora. Diaspora investment is yet another area in which China has out-performed India. The High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora noted in 2002 that the Chinese diaspora's investment in China is far greater than the Indian diaspora's investment in India.
Yet while the Indian diaspora has donated generously during calamities back home (Latur, Orissa Cyclone, Gujarat earthquake), barring a small minority, this support cannot be assumed to extend to investment and business decisions (RHLCID). Due to a number of different factors, from China to new generations of American-born Indians, it is premature for the Indian government to expect that the diaspora will work to help further India in foreign, economic and security policies over an extended period of time.
The U.S. Government's Gratitude
On the surface, the Indian Caucus which boasts the largest membership of any political group of its kind, sounds like the strongest argument for growing Indo-American political influence. However, Hathaway reveals that there is no downside to joining and indeed, one is under no obligation to do anything. "They [join] because their constituents want them to do so. There is no political downside and you please without really alienating anyone in your district. That's why you have [so many members]. My guess is that there are not more that 20 members of the caucus that know much about India or pay attention. In fact, some leaders of the caucus voted against Bhuj earthquake aid in 2001. You can't even assume leaders of the caucus will vote one way on issues of importance [to the Indo-U.S. community]."
In light of Hathaway's conjecture that the bill had majority support from the beginning, what was the motivation for Bush to issue praise and congressmen and women to receive members of the Indian diaspora?
The future
"The Indian Diaspora has to capitalize on the rapidly developing globalization and transnationalism to become a more significant political and economic force" (Helweg 111).
"They will continue to be active in community, cultural, and college campus politics, and, as they continue to grow in numbers, educational attainment, and wealth, they could become a broader political force to be reckoned with in the twenty-first century." (Khagram 281). For this to happen, Khagram stressed the need for forming and strengthening political organizations and building coalitions with other groups, especially other Asian American groups.
Although a portion remains aloof from political activities, a growing section of the community has been gaining political leverage. "Indo-Americans have [...] resorted to the quintessential American practice of fund-raising for political candidates at the federal, state and local levels [...] to draw the attention of mainstream politicians to their concerns." (RHLCID)
"There is considerable scope for better networking with other minority groups in the US like Afro-Americans, Hispanics, Chinese and Jews." (Report of the High Level Community)
"The genie's out of the bottle. The Indian community now knows how to exert themselves in a unifying matter," Sanjay said. He predicts the next issue to mobilize the community will be arguing for the right for India to have a seat on the Security Council in the UN.






















Bibliography
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Dutt, Sagarika. India in a globalized world. Manchester University Press. 2006.
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202.691.4012. E-mail: Robert.Hathaway@wilsoncenter.org
Helweg, Arthur W. "Strangers in a Not-So-Strange Land: Indian American
Immigrants in the Global Age." 2004.
High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora. New Delhi: Government of
India. 2002.
Gupta, Amit. Personal interview. Contact information: Phone: 334.201.7206. E
mail: sisir29@yahoo.com.
Khagram, Sanjeev; Manish Desai, Jason Varughese. Asians Americans and
Politics. Ed. Gordon H. Chang. "Seen, Rich, but Unheard?: The politics of
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703-488-6978. E-mail: cmorris@optimos.com
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Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper. 2004.
Shain, Yossi. "Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and
their homeland." Cambridge University Press. 1999.
Singh, Bal Ram. Personal interview. Contact information: Phone:
508.999.8588. E-mail: BSingh@umassd.edu.
www.usinpac.com

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